1. Why is it that the Bundesbank became the role model for the ECB?
  2. There is a difference between ‘instrument conservatism’ and ‘target conservatism’ in central banking. Can you explain the difference?
  3. Why is it that the ECB has been more cautious than the Federal Reserve in using its interest rate instrument?
  4. The Central Bank Governors in the Governing Council each have one vote, despite large differences in country size. Why did the drafters of the statutes of the ECB not choose a qualified voting system, as is the case for the Council of Ministers.
  5. How can the Taylor rule be used to measure the degree of convergence (or divergence) in the interest rates that are desired by the Governors of the national central banks?
  6. Will the new regulatory and supervisory structure in the European Union be strong enough to prevent future financial crises?
  7. The banking union consists of a single supervisory authority (the ECB) and an embryonic resolution mechanism. Is the latter likely to be sufficient to deal with a systemic banking crisis in the Eurozone?
  8. What is the Bagehot doctrine? Is it relevant for the role of the ECB as a lender of last resort?
  9. Explain why we concluded that the banking union is incomplete?
  10. Do you think that the present banking union in the Eurozone could withstand a new banking crisis?
  11. How would you sequence the further completion of the banking union?